Who empties the sea, what each one does, and the source for every claim — a standing companion to The Emptied Sea.
The three essays of this series argue that the emptying of the ocean is documented, funded in the open, and known to every party with a seat at the table. This page is the proof of that claim laid out plainly: the actors, organised by the part they play, each beside the source that establishes it. It is not a charge sheet. Almost everything recorded here is entirely legal — which is precisely the point.
How to read this ledger
Lawful but unsustainable Legal activity that the published record shows to be ecologically unsustainable. This is most of the list.
Independent index A standardised score from an independent body, reproduced rather than asserted.
Enforcement on record A specific authority has taken formal action; that action is cited. Reserved for the one category involving illegal conduct, whose particulars live in Part I.
Roles change and rankings are revised; this page is updated to match. Nothing here is an unproven allegation.
I · The subsidisersThose who pay for it
ChinaLawful but unsustainable
The largest single fisheries subsidiser — roughly US$7.2 billion in 2018, about a fifth of the global total, the overwhelming majority of it capacity-enhancing. Since 2016 it has stopped publishing the detail, devolving fuel support to provincial level where it can no longer be traced.
SourceSumaila et al., Marine Policy (2019); Oceana / Tabitha Mallory; The Outlaw Ocean Project.
The European UnionLawful but unsustainable
Through its ~€6 billion fisheries fund, repeatedly reintroduced capacity-building subsidies — new-vessel construction, engine replacement — that had been banned fifteen years earlier, over the objections of its own auditors and conservation groups.
SourceWWF; Oceana Europe; Seas At Risk.
United States · South Korea · JapanLawful but unsustainable
With China and the EU, complete the five entities that together provide roughly 58 percent of the world's fisheries subsidies.
SourceSumaila et al., Marine Policy (2019).
The system as a wholeLawful but unsustainable
Global fisheries subsidies run to about US$35.4 billion a year, of which ~US$22.2 billion is capacity-enhancing; some 81 percent flows to large industrial fleets, and more than half of high-seas fishing grounds would be unprofitable without it.
SourceSumaila et al. (2019); Sala et al., Science Advances (2018); IISD.
II · Distant-water nationsThose who send the fleets
ChinaLawful but unsustainable
The largest distant-water fleet on earth — as many as 16,000 vessels once militia-linked and foreign-flagged craft are counted — fishing the waters of 40-plus nations and every high sea, and dominating the global squid catch (50–70 percent of the high-seas haul).
SourceU.S. House Select Committee, China's Global Fishing Offensive (Jan 2026); Yale e360; The Outlaw Ocean Project.
The European Union — Spain and FranceLawful but unsustainable
The second-largest distant-water fleet; historically the biggest catcher of Indian Ocean yellowfin and the biggest deployer of drifting FADs.
SourceMongabay; Blue Marine Foundation.
TaiwanLawful but unsustainable
Among the largest longline fleets in the world; ranked second-worst on the independent IUU Fishing Risk Index.
SourceIUU Fishing Risk Index 2023 (Poseidon / GI-TOC).
South Korea · JapanLawful but unsustainable
Major distant-water longline fleets; South Korea sits among the ten worst performers on the IUU index.
SourceSumaila et al. (2019); IUU Fishing Risk Index 2023.
IranLawful but unsustainable
By tonnage, the single largest industrial catcher of Indian Ocean tuna.
SourceIOTC data, via the sourcing of Part II.
III · Named operatorsThe corporations
CNFC (China National Fisheries Corporation)Lawful but unsustainable
State-owned; operates the largest distant-water fleet in China, with liabilities effectively guaranteed by the state and a profitability that depends on fuel subsidies. Named for its lawful operations and ownership structure.
SourceSeafoodSource; Dialogue Earth / Everbright Securities.
Albacora, Pevasa, Echebastar (Spain) · SAPMER (France)Lawful but unsustainable
Among the principal operators of the Indian Ocean tuna purse-seine fleet. Investigations report their vessels are frequently registered in Seychelles, Mauritius or other flags through layers of holding companies that obscure beneficial ownership. Named for lawful operations and corporate structure — not for any illegal act.
SourceMongabay; Blue Marine Foundation, Europe's Hidden Tuna Empire (2026).
IV · Flags of convenience and reflaggingThose who rent out their flag
VanuatuLawful but unsustainable
Entered a joint venture with China's state fisheries corporation, lending its flag to a fleet that works its waters and lands the catch abroad.
SourcePart I sourcing; Vanuatu Daily Post; U.S. Congressional Research Service.
FijiLawful but unsustainable
Hosts Chinese-linked longliners under local registration; Suva harbour holds a graveyard of abandoned, mostly Chinese hulks.
SourcePart I sourcing; SeafoodSource; BenarNews.
Belize · Panama · Mauritius · Tanzania · OmanLawful but unsustainable
Recur as flags of convenience or reflagging destinations that let beneficial owners sit elsewhere and tap the quotas and concessions of smaller states.
SourceBlue Marine Foundation; U.S. CRS; Time / The Outlaw Ocean Project; Mongabay.
V · Coastal states — largely under duressThose who sell the access
Seychelles · Mauritius · MadagascarLawful but unsustainable
Land roughly 290,000 tonnes of Indian Ocean tuna a year through just three ports under European access agreements whose fees loom large in small national budgets.
SourceIDDRI Indian Ocean tuna report.
Senegal · Mauritania · Guinea-BissauLawful but unsustainable
Sell access to EU and Chinese fleets, often for far less than the catch is worth — appearing here in sorrow as much as in blame, for a weak negotiating hand is not the same as authorship.
SourcePart I–II sourcing; The Outlaw Ocean Project.
Kenya · Tanzania · MozambiqueLawful but unsustainable
Coastal states whose inshore fishers absorb the loss as the industrial fleet follows the fish or buys the next country's water.
SourcePart II sourcing; WWF; Standard Media.
VI · Importing markets and the processing chokepointThose who buy the catch
European Union · United States · JapanLawful but unsustainable
The great importing markets whose demand funds the distant-water model and sets the price that makes emptying a fishery worthwhile.
SourceFAO / global trade data.
China — as processorLawful but unsustainable
Roughly three-quarters of the seafood China imports is processed and re-exported; it has become the chokepoint of the world's seafood, a position a U.S. congressional report characterised as a strategy to deepen other nations' dependence. (Now under pressure from rising labour costs and trade shifts.)
SourceNOAA-published study; U.S. House Select Committee (2026); SeafoodSource.
VII · The regulatorsThose who were paid to watch
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)Lawful but unsustainable
Declared its yellowfin overfished in 2015 and has failed for a decade to impose an effective rebuilding plan, because any member can nullify a limit simply by objecting to it.
SourceIOTC Scientific Committee; Mongabay; WWF.
Western & Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)Lawful but unsustainable
Observes barely one-twentieth of its longline fishing effort.
SourceThe Pew Charitable Trusts; ISSF.
World Trade OrganizationLawful but unsustainable
Took twenty-four years to discipline even the narrowest band of harmful subsidies; its 2025 agreement (“Fish 1”) self-terminates if a second package is not agreed within roughly four years.
SourceWTO; Pew; Oceana.
VIII · IUU Fishing Risk Index 2023The independent scorecard
Worst performersIndependent index
China ranks worst in the world at 3.69 of 5 — the worst flag and port state, three editions running. Russia, Taiwan, South Korea, Ukraine, Yemen, India, Iran, Indonesia and Comoros also fall among the ten worst. The global average is about 2.28; the United States scores ~2.29.
SourcePoseidon Aquatic Resource Management & the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, IUU Fishing Risk Index 2023.
Best performersIndependent index
Belgium (1.43), Latvia and Estonia score cleanest — proof, if any were needed, that the failure recorded above is a choice and not a law of nature.
SourceIUU Fishing Risk Index 2023.
IX · Enforcement on the recordWhere the conduct crosses into the illegal
Catalogued, with sources, in Part IEnforcement on record
Documented forced-labour and IUU enforcement actions — such as the U.S. import ban on a Fiji-based, Chinese-linked longliner over forced-labour indicators, and the New Zealand foreign-charter-vessel scandal that ended in a 2016 reflagging law — are set out, each beside its enforcement source, in Part I, “The Walls Never Came Down.”
SourceSee Part I and its colophon for the primary enforcement records.
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About these sources
This Ledger consolidates the sourcing of the three essays of The Emptied Sea and is maintained as the underlying assessments and rankings are revised. Subsidy figures: Sumaila et al., Marine Policy (2019); Sala et al., Science Advances (2018); IISD; Oceana / Tabitha Mallory; the WTO. Fleet, squid and processing material: the U.S. House Select Committee report China's Global Fishing Offensive (January 2026, a U.S. government source, cross-checked against independent reporting), Yale e360, The Outlaw Ocean Project, a NOAA-published re-export study, and SeafoodSource. Indian Ocean operators, beneficial ownership, reflagging and ‘going dark’: Mongabay and the Blue Marine Foundation. Flag-of-convenience and access arrangements: as documented in Parts I and II and their colophons, with the U.S. Congressional Research Service and IDDRI. Regulatory failures: the IOTC Scientific Committee, the Pew Charitable Trusts and ISSF, and the WTO. Country rankings: the independent IUU Fishing Risk Index 2023 (Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime). China denies the maritime-militia and intelligence characterisations described by U.S. naval analysts. Every actor here is named for a documented role; entries marked Lawful but unsustainable describe legal activity, and the single entry marked Enforcement on record points to formal actions sourced in Part I. Nothing in this Ledger is an unproven allegation of criminal conduct against a named party.